**CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT** CCD/443
21 August 1974

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

---

# DRAFT REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

## INTRODUCTION

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission a progress report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 16 April 19 to 22 August 1974, together with the pertinent documents and records.

This report includes accounts of the Committee's work during 1974 on further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear measures, including the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, other collateral measures, and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

A special report on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear tests is set forth in Part III of this document.

## I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

### A. Procedural Arrangements

Two sessions were held. The first, from 16 April to 23 May 1974, and the second, from 2 July to 22 August 1974. During this period, the Committee held formal plenary meetings during which members set forth their governments' views and recommendations for progress on the questions before the Committee. The Committee also held seven informal meetings without records.

In addition to the plenary meetings described above, members of the Committee met frequently for informal multilateral consultations on disarmament questions of common interest.

### B. Participants in the Conference

Representatives of the following States continue their participation in the work of the Committee: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia.

E.7.-63442
74-24047

The Co-Chairmen and the other Members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have agreed to invite the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire to become Members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament beginning 1 January 1975. Bearing in mind General Assembly Resolution 2602 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, the Committee is reporting this agreement to the General Assembly for its endorsement.

In letters dated 6 August 1974 to the Co-Chairmen, Australia confirmed its interest in securing membership of the Committee. This request was noted and, with the concurrence of Australia, consideration of it by the Committee has been deferred to a later date.

II. WORK OF THE COMMITTEE DURING 1974

In a letter dated 1 April 1974, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the resolutions adopted at the 28th session of the General Assembly on Disarmament Questions.

Members of the Committee were assisted in their examination and analysis of possible disarmament measures by working papers and other documents that were submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (Annexes A and B) and the plenary statements of Committee members (Annex C).

At the opening plenary meeting of the 1974 session, the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations presented a message to the Conference from the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In his message, the Secretary-General noted some of the significant achievements of the Committee. He also referred to negotiations, at the regional level, underway in Vienna on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments in Central Europe and at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Secretary-General emphasized that the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to be held in 1975 would offer an opportunity to strengthen the Treaty. He expressed the view that, at the bilateral level, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States have produced important agreements, and that they provide encouraging indications of the direction in which the international community wishes to move. The Secretary-General stated that these developments, important though they are, represent only initial steps and that increased efforts will be required for success in halting the arms race. The Secretary-General observed that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continues to be most directly concerned with two questions, namely, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the prohibition of chemical weapons. He reiterated his view that the stage has now been reached where it would be of evident usefulness to all concerned to move on t

concrete negotiations in working towards the complete realization of the objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons. He also reaffirmed his view that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is an indispensable step in the efforts to halt the nuclear arms race, and that he shared the grave concern voiced by the General Assembly over the lack of progress towards such a ban. The Secretary-General stated that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has proved through the years that it is an effective organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations, and he expressed confidence that the Committee will once again spare no effort to achieve further progress in the disarmament field.

The Committee continued work in accordance with its provisional agenda on the following measures in the field of disarmament:

(a) Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

(b) Non-nuclear measures

(c) Other collateral measures

(d) General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

A. Further Effective Measures Relating to the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race at an Early Date and to Nuclear Disarmament

Members of the Committee continued their work in 1974 on questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

In accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3078 B (XXVIII), a special report on the results of the Committee's deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests has been prepared and is set forth as Part III of this document.

The delegation of the USSR stated that of great importance for diminishing and eliminating the danger of nuclear war would be the implementation of the solemn declaration of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations concerning their renunciation of the use or threat of force, and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It called upon the Security Council to take as soon as possible appropriate measures to implement that solemn declaration in full, and expressed the view that strict observance by States of the solemn declaration of the United Nations on the matter would substantially contribute to the consolidation of peace. The delegation of the Soviet Union declared the readiness of the USSR to come to agreement with any nuclear power and to formalize in an appropriate way mutual obligations with regard to the non-use of force, including simultaneous prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.627, 639). Similar views were expressed by the delegations of Bulgaria, Hungary and Mongolia (CCD/PV.630, 632, 634).

The delegation of Romania expressed the view that a genuine détente cannot be built on force and on the instruments of force-arms and that new democratic relationships between States should be introduced based on confidence, equal rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty and the rounciation of the use of force or the threat of such use in international intercourse (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of the United States of America stated that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and USSR continue in an effort to place additional controls on strategic offensive weapons systems and eventually to reduce the number of these systems deployed by the United States and USSR. It noted that the Standing Consultative Commission on SALT has also begun to meet to promote the objectives and implementation of that agreement and of the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and said that this Commission is a reflection of the importance of the initial SALT agreements and of the strong desire of the parties to implement those agreements effectively (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of Japan emphasized that efforts must be made to stop an arms race, which is sometimes called "armament for the sake of disarmament," and to reduce as soon as possible the balance of military power to a lower level. It is said that if such efforts are not made any attempt at disarmament will eventually be offset by "armament for the sake of disarmament" with no hope for strengthening world peace and security. The delegation expressed the hope that both the United States and the USSR will pay heed to this point and make efforts to substantiate détente (CCD/PV.628).

The delegation of Pakistan expressed the view that, despite the spirit of détente, the SALT talks, and other channels available to super Powers, there has been no reversal in the alarming trend of the spiralling nuclear arms race between them. It stated that the imperatives of peace and prosperity demand the highest degree of statesmanship from those who are in a position to influence and perhaps mold the forces of current history, and called on the United States and USSR to reach concrete solutions to problems that had hitherto remained unresolved (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Czechoslovakia stated that the process of the lessening of international tension in the political sphere should be supplemented by military détente. The delegation indicated that socialist States are in this respect prepared to adopt far-reaching measures considerably helping gradually to solve the main problem which the delegation continues to believe to be general and complete disarmament (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of India expressed the view that, from the qualitative point of view, the nuclear arms race has assumed frightening proportions, and that research and development in the field of nuclear weapons have become even more intense. It expressed the view that the best way of checking the qualitative development of nuclear weapons is to agree on a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Egypt pointed out that since the adjournment of the meetings of the CCD in August 1973, a number of international events and developments have taken place which have their impact or bearing on its work. It stated that the continuing trend towards détente has given hope to the possibility of easing international tension in the interest of international peace and security. It noted that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe entered its delicate and important stage of preparing 'drafts of declarations, recommendations, resolutions or other final documents'. It pointed out that the October war in the Middle East was a disturbing reminder of the possibility that the continuous threat to peace in the Middle East could give rise to a world conflagration of much wider dimensions.

The delegation of Romania stressed the fact that despite the existence of the CCD and the negotiations in other forums the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, has followed its ascending curve totally unimpeded thus placing its grim stamp on the economic and social life of the nations and on their peace and security. It said that the failure to achieve concrete understandings on nuclear disarmament will induce other States to seek ways and means of developing their arsenals, including nuclear weapons. For that reason Romania is firmly in favour of hastening the negotiations in the CCD, concentrating as a matter of priority on nuclear disarmament. It reiterated concrete issues which it had proposed for negotiation in the nuclear field namely a ban of the use of nuclear weapons; guarantees of security to States not possessing nuclear weapons; cessation of the production and development of nuclear weapons; and reduction and total elimination of arsenals of nuclear weapons and their vectors (CCD/PV.637 and 640).

The delegation of the Soviet Union said it advocates real changes in the field of disarmament and considers it necessary to develop broad co-operation in this field based on the principles of equal security for all States with no unilateral actions for some countries to the detriment of the interest of other parties to the agreement (CCD/PV.639).

The delegation of the Soviet Union, referring to the third Soviet-United States Summit meeting, said that of fundamental significance is the determination of the USSR and United States, recorded in the Summit documents, to apply their joint efforts to removing the danger of war, including particularly war involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to limiting and eventually ending the arms race, especially of strategic arms, and to strengthening and extending the process of relaxation of tensions throughout the world (CCD/PV.642).

The delegation of the United States said that while the arms control agreements signed in Moscow are the product of discussions between two States, they are also a contribution to the broad international effort in which we are engaged and are directed at widely shared goals: the strengthening of peace, the further relaxation of international tensions, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.643).

The delegation of Sweden said that it welcomed the agreement at the recent Moscow Summit meeting to abstain mutually from a second ABM site, which reinforces the important ABM Treaty of 1972. It expressed the view, however, that the continuing stalemate and pessimistic undertones regarding the central issue of curbing offensive strategic nuclear weapons give rise to misgiving as to the possibilities of containing this still accelerated arms race in this field (CCD/PV.647).

The delegation of Mexico tabled a document (CCD/439) containing the texts of the bilateral SALT agreements of 1973 since it considered them of direct interest to the Committee and because one of them contains the following provision regarding the implementation of which it would be useful to have some relevant explanation from the two signatory States: "Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974" (CCD/PV.650).

A number of delegations commented on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The delegation of Italy, quoting from a recent speech of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the signing in Moscow of a Protocol to the 1972 ABM treaty looks positive because the two major powers have voluntarily devested themselves of a defense potential. It also said that technological progress in the nuclear field will entail ever bigger risks of mass destruction and expressed the hope that agreements for curbing offensive strategic nuclear weapons be reached before it is too late. (CCD/PV.652).

The delegation of the United States reported on the establishment by United Nations members party to the NPT, of a Preparatory Committee to make arrangements for the 1975 NPT Review Conference, and on completion of the first meeting of the Committee and plans for two further preparatory meetings in August 1974 and February 1975. It is proposed that the Review Conference begin on 5 May 1975. The delegation also reported completion by the Federal Republic of Germany of its parliamentary procedures for NPT ratification, and noted that Japan had indicated that such procedures would be initiated. It expressed the hope that other nations would also adhere to the NPT in time to participate in the Review Conference, and expressed pleasure at the adherence of Sudan and Gabon, both of which will so participate (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of Mexico stated that the NPT was another patent example of a partial disarmament measure urgently awaiting completion. The delegation expressed the view that, although the Treaty was proclaimed by the two superpowers and originally accepted by the non-nuclear weapon States as a balanced treaty designed to ban both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, in practice the NPT had been used by those Powers to consolidate their privileged position and at the same time continue, heedlessly and relentlessly, the nuclear arms race through increased nuclear-weapon testing (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of Japan expressed the view that, in order to stabilize and make durable the NPT system, it must be supplemented and complemented by the limitation of strategic weapons and the prohibition of all kinds of nuclear-weapon tests and that, pending NPT Review Conference scheduled for next year, this is the very point that we should now have clearly in mind. (CCD/PV.628).

The delegation of the United Kingdom stressed that if the NPT was partial it was because not all countries were as yet prepared to accede to it. Citing the protracted negotiations and extensive compromise that led to the treaty, the delegation reaffirmed the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and observed that over two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations had acceded to or signed the treaty. The delegation suggested that the Committee might profitably consider how to increase the incentives to adhere to the NPT (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Mongolia emphasized the special importance of strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was rightly regarded as one of the most important instruments aimed at protecting mankind from the horrors of nuclear catastrophe.

The delegation of Mongolia, having expressed the hope that the forthcoming Review Conference of the NPT would make a valuable contribution to the strengthening of that Treaty, considered it necessary that appropriate measures be taken in that direction without waiting for the Conference. (CCD/634).

The delegation of Poland cited the NPT as the most important multilateral agreement in the nuclear field; as living testimony to the negotiating ability of the CCD. It expressed the view that the objective of the Review Conference must be consolidation and strengthening the Treaty and enlarging its scope by encouraging the widest participation in and strict observance of its provisions. The delegation expressed the further hope that all CCD participants could take part in the Review Conference in 1975 (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of India noted continuance of vertical proliferation despite the NPT, and suggested that in such circumstances the danger of nuclear war may not be reduced just by more non-nuclear-weapons States becoming parties to the NPT. It cited MIRV and MARV developments in the strategic, and "mini-nuke" developments in the tactical field as examples of vertical proliferation (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Czechoslovakia stressed Czechoslovakia's endeavours, in conjunction with other States, to bar all access to nuclear weapons for all countries not possessing such weapons. The delegation expressed the hope that the preparation of the Review Conference, as well as the Conference itself, would further strengthen the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and add to its Parties. (CCD/PV.644).

The delegation of Romania expressed the view that the NPT Review Conference has the task of carrying out with the equal participation of all States parties to the Treaty a multilateral and serious analysis of the practical results of the implementation of the Treaty and of defining political, legal and material measures to ensure total implementation of the Treaty (CCD/PV.637, CCD/PV.648).

The delegation of Romania underlined that the NPT was conceived and considered by many countries as a step to disarmament and strengthening international security. In its view the Treaty should have been followed, in accordance with its provisions by new efforts and concrete measures in the disarmament field. Since the results of the work of the CCD are far from meeting that expectation, the non-nuclear States have the duty to consistently ask for resolute steps to be taken towards disarmament and guarantees for their security.

It reiterated the need for the States possessing nuclear weapons to assume a solemn obligation not to use these weapons or threaten their use against anyone in any circumstances (CCD/PV.637 and CCD/PV.652).

The delegation of Italy said that any advance in nuclear arms limitation and nuclear disarmament would greatly contribute to reinforce the NPT. The Review Conference, planned for May 1975, should aim at an improvement of the existing Convention and have the objective of offering more incentives to States which have not yet done so to adhere fully to the treaty. (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of India read the following official announcement regarding an underground peaceful nuclear explosion conducted by India on 18 May 1974:

> "The Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India, announced today that it carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment using an implosion device. The explosion was carried out at a depth of more than 100 metres.
>
> "As part of the programme of study of peaceful uses of nuclear explosion, Government of India had undertaken a programme to keep itself abreast of developments in this technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of mining and earth-moving operations.
>
> "The Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India also stated that India had no intention of producing nuclear weapons, and reitered its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear explosions."

The delegation repeated India's affirmation of the right to use nuclear explosion technology for peaceful purposes, and declared its intention to pursue experiments in that direction. India, it stated, is committed to use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and to the study of all meaningful applications of economic significance; development of peaceful nuclear explosion technology is part of that policy. It stated that all countries developing uses of nuclear energy are nuclear powers, those which develop or possess nuclear weapons are nuclear weapon powers and reaffirmed that India had no intention of becoming a nuclear weapon power. (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Japan expressed regret over the test conducted by India, repeating the long-standing opposition of the Japanese Government to all nuclear tests by all countries, and noting that there is no distinguishing between a nuclear test for peaceful purposes and a nuclear weapon test (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Canada stated its Government's concern at India's decision to explode a nuclear device, calling it a severe setback to efforts by the CCD to halt all testing and check proliferation. Citing Canada's long-standing co-operation with India in the nuclear energy field, for peaceful purposes, the delegation noted that as a party to the NPT Canada sees no difference between development of explosives for peaceful and for military purposes (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Sweden reiterated its Government's opposition to all nuclear tests and concern at their continuation. It quoted the statement of the Swedish Prime Minister, in which he observed, inter alia, that the Indian explosion breaks the development of detente and normal neighbourly relations on the Indian subcontinent: thus, the test and planned series of new explosions causes concern. The Prime Minister called for intensified efforts to make the NPT embrace all States, and to achieve a comprehensive ban against nuclear tests generally (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of the United States reaffirmed the opposition of the United States to nuclear proliferation, because of its adverse impact on world stability (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Canada described the Indian explosion as a severe and major setback to efforts to halt proliferation and testing, but reaffirmed its Government's view that the NPT is the most important of the multilateral agreements achieved by the CCD. Describing the NPT as the only commitment among nations against the spread of nuclear weapons, the delegation expressed the hope for adherence by more parties, and expressed confidence that the significance of support of the NPT by an increasing majority of UN Members will not be lost on those Governments currently reluctant to accede to the treaty (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the Netherlands stated that its Government views the Indian action (nuclear explosion) with utmost concern, and that it has taken note of the Indian announcement that it had no intention of becoming a nuclear-weapon Power and remains committed to using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Government is of the opinion that it is difficult to distinguish between a nuclear test for peaceful purposes, as carried out by India, and a nuclear test for weapon purposes. It believes that the Indian nuclear test undoubtedly represents a serious setback to non-proliferation efforts and efforts to ban tests everywhere and by everyone; a psychological dam has been breached. The Netherlands Government remains committed to a policy of non-proliferation and favours the widest possible adherence to the NPT; the delegation noted that the Review Conference offers an opportunity to

enhance the viability of the treaty in all its aspects, and conveyed the appeal of its Government for renewed efforts by all members of the Committee toward nuclear arms control and disarmament, first by a cessation of all tests (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of Nigeria stated its Government's belief in the NPT, and that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a few States increases insecurity of all States. It cited inequalities of rights and obligations under the NPT, but had hoped that the development of new nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear weapons States would be arrested, as well as acquisition by non-nuclear-weapons States. The delegation noted the lack of benefits under Articles IV and V of the NPT, as well as under the eleventh and ninth preambular paragraphs and Article VI, and asserted that under these conditions the Indian test was expected. This did not make the shock easier to bear, and Nigeria is opposed to all nuclear tests, calls for a comprehensive test ban, and hopes that India will refrain from further testing now that its point is made (CCD/PV.638). The delegation (Nigerian) stated that it was glad to note India's intentions to use its newly-acquired nuclear capability solely and exclusively for peaceful purposes (CCD/429).

The delegation of the United Kingdom stated that its Government, as a depository power of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, PTBT and the NPT, is particularly concerned that these treaties should be accepted by as many countries as possible and should be generally respected. It believes that nuclear explosions for whatever purpose should be carried out within the context of these treaties, and notes that particular care was taken in the drafting of the NPT to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions should be accessible to all countries (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the importance of increased participation in the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the NPT. It suggested that practical steps should be devised to encourage accession, that the Review Conference should be used to review the operation of the NPT, and that the most important task of that Conference will be to devise steps for strengthening the NPT in every possible way (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of Pakistan, represented by the Foreign Secretary of the Government of Pakistan, voiced the deep concern of the Government and the people of Pakistan over the emergence of a sixth nuclear weapon Power. Describing a situation of menace to the immediate neighbours of India, the delegation asserted that the barrier to nuclear proliferation interposed by the NPT had been demolished. It cited increased dangers of nuclear war described by the delegation of the Soviet Union in the First Committee of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1624, para. 37), and the immediate reaction of the Government of Pakistan (CCD/423 and CCD/422). It noted that there is no technical

difference between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives manufactured for peaceful purposes, a fact agreed to by the many authorities cited. Thus, all States that explode nuclear devices are ipso facto nuclear-weapons Powers. The delegation further recalled warnings by the Government of Pakistan that an Indian test would be conducted ostensibly for peaceful purposes, and it expressed concern about the uninspected CIR reactor, citing assurances that had been given that the reactor would be used for peaceful purposes only, although this reactor must have been the source of material for the Indian test. It pointed out the adverse effects of the test on detente in the South Asian sub-continent, outlining the political implications of the potential threat to Pakistan's security and its unique position in regard to this threat. The delegation cited a statement by Prime Minister Bhutto calling for credible security assurances for non-nuclear weapons States in the form of a joint undertaking in the nature of an obligation by all permanent members of the Security Council to act collectively or individually on behalf of threatened States (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of India repeated the announcement of the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion read earlier (CCD/PV.637). It also read a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of India reiterating inter alia India's intent not to develop nuclear weapons, that no obligations had been violated by conduct of the test, and that apprehensions aroused in Pakistan are unfounded (presented as working papers CCD/424 and CCD/425 respectively). The delegation noted with gratitude the statement by Nigeria recognizing the Indian declaration of the peaceful purpose of its explosion (CCD/PV.638). It stressed that neither international obligations nor any bilateral agreement had been violated, and suggested that opposition to all nuclear testing, particularly by NPT parties, is inconsistent with provision for peaceful explosions to be carried out by nuclear-weapon Powers.

The delegation of India emphasized that internation opinion as reflected in the various United Nations resolutions clearly speaks of nuclear weapon testing. It would not, therefore, be correct to say that India had acted, or has acted, in contravention of international opinion. It asked further as to how the distinguished delegates could now say that they are opposed to all nuclear testing after having supported those very United Nations resolutions which make a clear distinction between peaceful nuclear explosions and weapon tests by adopting the terminology nuclear weapon tests (CCD/PV.638). It also stated that the test did not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons because the experiment carried out was for peaceful purposes. The delegation added that the test did not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons because the experiment carried out was for peaceful purposes.

Referring to the objection that peaceful nuclear explosions involve the same technology as nuclear weapons explosions and therefore should not be carried out, the Indian delegation disagreed with this concept and gave the example of dual-purpose chemical agents which nobody in the CCD had thought of prohibiting as far as their peaceful uses were concerned (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation cited a letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan wherein she had stated that India remained fully committed to her traditional policy of developing nuclear energy resources entirely for peaceful purposes and that the recent underground nuclear experiment conducted by the Indian scientists in no way has altered this policy. The Prime Minister of India also assured the Prime Minister of Pakistan that India remained committed to settle all its differences with Pakistan peacefully through bilateral negotiations in accordance with the Simla Agreement under which both countries have resolved to break away from the past history of confrontation and conflict and work to develop normal relations and establish durable peace. The Indian Prime Minister had stated further that there was no reason whatsoever to give up this healthy trend on the part of either country merely because India had conducted a test for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (CCD/PV.638).

It stated that the security protection granted to non-nuclear weapon countries should not be confined to certain limited groups or parties, such as the parties to the NPT, but should encompass all the countries which did not have the means to defend themselves against nuclear weapons.

The delegation of India drew the attention of the Committee to the double standards adopted by Pakistan while commenting on the Indian nuclear explosion. The Indian delegation noted that Pakistan was not a party to the PTB. The Indian delegation quoted various official statements made by Pakistani leaders wherein they had welcomed and congratulated China for its weapons tests in the atmosphere (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of Pakistan asserted that intentions were not enough to assure peace and security. It cited once again the indistinguishability of peaceful and military nuclear explosives and recognition by the Security Council that acquisition of a peaceful nuclear explosion capability created a new situation in which security measures would require strengthening. The delegation pointed out that it is now necessary in its view to go beyond the assurances of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the United States reaffirmed the policy of its Government against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and its support of the NPT as one of the most significant contributions to disarmament and world peace. It urged States that had not adhered to the treaty to do so. It restated the view of the United States that the technology of making nuclear-explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons. The delegation cited its understanding on record in the IAEA that in all United States bilateral agreements for co-operation in the nuclear field the use of any material or equipment supplied by the United States under such agreements for any nuclear-explosive device is precluded, and that the IAEA would verify that the safeguarded material was not used for any nuclear explosive device; continued co-operation with other countries is dependent on the assurance that these understandings will continue to be respected in the future (CCD/PV.639).

The delegation of the Soviet Union noted with regret that a number of important so-called near-nuclear States have not yet become parties to the NPT, and suggested that the Review Conference should consider measures to ensure greater participation (CCD/PV.639).

The delegation of the United Kingdom recalled that the purpose of the NPT was, and still is, to control the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive technology in order to facilitate further NPT ratifications, the United Kingdom Government had voluntarily offered to place its peaceful nuclear programme under IAEA safeguards. The NPT made provision for non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty to enjoy the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. The delegation went on to say that the United Kingdom had hoped that the success of the NPT would be confirmed at the forthcoming Review Conference, but Her Majesty's Government could not hide its deep concern over the Indian nuclear test. The assurances by the Indian Government of peaceful intent were noted, but India's decision had increased the danger that others may decide to follow suit. The delegation suggested that it may prove necessary to consider whether there are ways to strengthen the guarantees and safeguards contained in the Treaty to give greater assurance and confidence to those countries still, by failure to adhere to the treaty, indicating a desire to keep open their nuclear option. It endorsed the Soviet view (CCD/PV.638) that it will be the most important task of the Review Conference to devise ways of strengthening the NPT, in order to achieve a positive extension of the international anti-proliferation regime (CCD/PV.641).

The delegation of India repeated the position of the Government of India that the NPT is not an equal legal instrument. It was a discriminatory instrument and India would not become a party to it as long as its discriminatory character remains as it is

today. The delegation of India wondered whether the Review Conference might take a look at this character of the NPT and try to change it so as to make possible for it to be accepted universally (CCD/PV.641).

The delegation of Japan recognized the inherent right of all States to all research and development for the peaceful application of nuclear energy and to sharing the benefit deriving therefrom and stated that, if an when a peaceful explosion becomes distinguishable from nuclear weapons through some future technical innovation unpredictable at present, then all States should of course have access to its production and use, in the same manner as to other forms of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The delegation pointed out, however, that so long as it is the very momentary energy of a nuclear explosion that is used for the purpose of its peaceful application, the characteristics of a peaceful nuclear explosion, which releases an enormous amount of energy, in a matter of moments, are precisely the same as those of a nuclear weapon and different from those of nuclear reactors which derive energy from nuclear reactions in a controlled manner. It maintained, therefore, that, regardless of the intent of its producer or possessor, a "peaceful" nuclear explosive device cannot avoid having a "military" implication and that the birth of a "nuclear test Power" constitutes the proliferation of the centre of independent decision-making concerning the use of nuclear explosive devices and is nothing but the birth of a new "nuclear Power".

Under these circumstances, it emphasized that the time is already ripe for examining international arrangements concerning the implementation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes so that any nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes be conducted under some international control. It equally emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, bear special responsibility in making international efforts so as to prevent the proliferation of centres of independent decision-making which detonate a nuclear explosive device and that there remain a number of matters that nuclear-weapon States should carry out for that purpose (CCD/PV.628).

The delegation of Pakistan endorsed the suggestion by the delegation of the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.641) that it may prove necessary for guarantees and safeguards under the NPT to be strengthened, citing the resolution adopted at the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at Kuala Lumpur (June 1974). It suggested that India could give concrete manifestation that its programme was for peaceful purposes by placing it entirely under the IAEA Safeguard system (CCD/PV.642).

The Delegation of Pakistan has placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and suggested India should do likewise. It described Pakistan's response to the Indian test as political, rather than nuclear, and reiterated Pakistan's desire for adequate security assurances, (CCD/PV.643).

The Delegation of Pakistan announced that the recent nuclear explosion by India had resulted in the spread of radioactive fallout to and over the territory of Pakistan. This conclusion had been reached after a careful investigation by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.

The Delegation of the United States directed attention of the Committee to language in the Joint United States-Soviet Communiqué in which both the United States and the USSR emphasize the fundamental importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm their obligations under the Treaty including Article VI, and state that they favoured increasing the Treaty's effectiveness (CCD/PV.643).

The Delegation of India stressed that India with the third largest Muslim population in the world had not been represented at the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at Kuala Lumpur and could not, therefore, regard the views expressed by the Conference as being in the proper perspective (CCD/PV.642).

The Delegation of India noted that Pakistan itself had declared that it could not be expected legally to foreclose its nuclear option. It had not fully answered the question as to why Pakistan was concerned only about India's nuclear explosion and not about nuclear testing in general. Replying to the question as to why India does not place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards, the Indian Delegation stated that the Indian Government was for safeguards which were applicable universally and on a non-discriminatory basis. The Indian Delegation also pointed out that the CCD was a multi-national negotiating body for disarmament. The tradition in the CCD, to avoid discussion of problems of bilateral nature in whatever garb they might be brought up, should be respected. If Pakistan's concern was of a bilateral nature, then the Simla Agreement provided an adequate framework (CCD/PV.643).

The Delegation of Bulgaria expressed the hope that Governments would make all possible efforts to contribute to the reaffirmation of the basic aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that States which had not yet adhered to the Treaty, and in particular the near-nuclear States, would join the other participants (CCD/PV.649).

The Delegation of Mexico reiterated its view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a partial instrument which remained truncated and mutilated not because of a lack of accessions, but rather as a result of the failure of the nuclear super Powers to comply with the basic provisions contained in its Articles VI and V (CCD/PV.627 and 628).

The Yugoslav Delegation expressed itself in favour of measures which it thought should be taken in order to remove the growing doubts about the credibility of the NPT, to strengthen the confidence in it and make it universally acceptable. It suggested undertaking of a solemn obligation by the nuclear-weapon States never to use in any circumstances nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or to threaten those States with the use of such weapons, and to withdraw nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States. It also stated that a comprehensive test ban is one of the most urgent and important measures to be taken in order to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a prerequisite for the creation of an internationally-agreed régime governing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for which, according to Article V of the NPT, an international conference should be convened. It also urged that a wider and more intensive application of nuclear energy and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should be made available to the developing non-nuclear-weapon States and that new ways and means should be found for financing such activities, especially for the supply of energy needs and accessibility to nuclear fuels (CCD/PV.651).

The Delegation of India stated that it should not be a matter of surprise or regret if India, without contravening any treaty it has entered into, were to experiment and try to develop nuclear explosion technology for exploiting natural resources within its own territory. The Indian Delegation made it clear that India was not prepared to wait for others to perfect nuclear explosion technology and thereby lag behind them by a decade or more in its development.

The Indian Delegation quoted various sources and authorities to demonstrate that peaceful explosions were a legitimate activity for a country's economic development and that India was not alone in holding such a view.

The Indian Delegation replied to the suggestion that it should place its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards by drawing attention to the Indian statement made before the IAEA Board of Governors wherein it had been said that India would certainly consider this possibility when all the member States of the Agency and indeed others too outside the Agency, voluntarily place all their nuclear activities, civil and military, under the Agency's safeguards. The Indian Delegation also indicated that it had consistently advocated safeguards on a completely non-discriminatory basis so that they do not operate mainly against the developing countries and that they should be devised on functional criteria.

It expressed surprise that while the nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States were allowed to operate in a completely unrestrained manner, some delegations seemed more concerned with controlling the peaceful activities of non-nuclear-weapon countries. The delegation also refuted the criticism that the Indian explosion for peaceful purposes had somehow damaged the NPT. There was no question of other countries going in for nuclear weapons because of India's example since India had solemnly declared, even after the explosion, its intention to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.

The Indian Delegation made it clear that it had no desire to campaign against the NPT although it disagreed with its approach. India was opposed to all proliferation, vertical or horizontal, of nuclear weapons. The Indian Delegation expressed the hope that all nuclear-weapon States, as well as non-nuclear weapon States, like India, would commit themselves to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. It added that the nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility in this matter (CCD/PV.651).

The Delegation of Sweden said that in order to implement the NPT fully in regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, an agreement on such explosions must be concluded and that this agreement must state explicitly that the potential benefits should be made available on a non-discriminatory basis to those countries that forego production of nuclear devices. The technical feasibility of a particular project, its economic, health and safety aspects should be evaluated by the IAEA. The over-all advisability of the project should be determined by a political international body which should also have the authority to license such a project. As to the execution of the project, the IAEA would have an important role to play in arranging for and controlling the actual explosion. This was only one aspect of the imperative that the use of nuclear energy in general should be under the control of an international régime, which would protect all nuclear material in order to prevent nuclear-weapons proliferation and guarantee the safest possible management of nuclear-energy production (CCD/PV.647).

The Delegation of the USSR stated that it could not share criticism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of its safeguards system by some delegations in the Committee. It noted that the system of safeguards that had been elaborated by a large number of States, was sufficiently effective and served the purposes for which it had been established. The USSR delegation called upon States Parties to the NPT, which had not yet done so, to speed the conclusion of safeguards agreements and the finalization of relevant understandings on the practical implementation of the Treaty's provision

prescribing that exports of fissionable material and special equipment to non-nuclear countries should be carried out solely under control of the IAEA. The Soviet delegation noted that the revision of the present safeguards system proposed by Sweden could only lead the Committee away from the task of an all-round strengthening of the said system. It pointed out that peaceful nuclear explosions had so far no practical application because of inadequate technology and that therefore there were no grounds for speaking of failure to implement the relevant provisions of the Treaty.

The USSR delegation drew attention to the agreements concluded during the third Soviet-United States Summit meeting, notably, to the Protocol on the limitation of the ABM systems, Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests, the understandings to undertake joint Soviet-United States initiative to outlaw the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare and to prohibit the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes, and emphasized that those agreements contributed largely to the implementation of the obligations of the two Powers under the NPT. The Soviet delegation did not accept the assessment of some of the Soviet-United States agreements given by the Swedish delegation.

Referring to the question of the so-called "mini-nukes", that is of nuclear mini-weapons, the USSR delegation stated that the USSR's obligations under the Security Council Resolution 255 and the Soviet-United States Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war covered all types of nuclear weapons, whatever their power. (CCD/PV.650).

******

The delegation of the United States, answering questions raised by the delegation of Sweden at the 633rd Plenary Meeting, stated that the United States Government has no intention whatever to treat low-yield tactical nuclear weapons systems as interchangeable with conventional arms, that it fully appreciates the distinction or "firebreak" between nuclear and non-nuclear arms as an important factor in preventing nuclear warfare, and that it will not act to erode this distinction. The delegation also stated that the United States interprets Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968, concerning security assurances as applying to nuclear aggression in which only "mini-nukes" were used, and that the agreement between the United States and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war would apply to wars in which only "mini-nukes" were used (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of Sweden expressed its satisfaction over the statements made by the representative of the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.625), the representative of the United States (CCD/PV 638) and the representative of the USSR (CCD/PV.650) on the subject of "mini-nukes" and said that the position taken by these Governments should remove one of the potential dangers to the NPT regime. The issue of nuclear mini-weapons could under the present circumstances be considered closed in the CCD (CCD/PV.647, 651).

The delegation of Yugoslavia expressed its concern at the continuance of the arms race, the increase of nuclear stockpiles, and the improvement of nuclear-weapon systems. It said that its attention was particularly drawn to the constant increase of different types and stockpiles of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, and to the possibility of being used also in "local" wars. While noting the good intention expressed at the time of the conclusion of some of the recent arms-control agreements, it stated that these have been immediately followed by nuclear-weapon tests and the announcement of a new series of test aimed at further improvement of nuclear weapons. It urged the nuclear-weapon States to proceed more quickly along the road of nuclear disarmament, otherwise it may be expected that a certain number of non-nuclear weapon States will try to solve their defence problems by developing and producing their own nuclear weapons. (CCD/PV.651).

The question of nuclear-free zones was also discussed.

The delegation of Poland expressed the view that the Committee may consider certain aspects of nuclear-free zones essential to gain the widest support for and respect of such zones (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of Romania stated that the Romanian Government has consistently pressed for proposals for the transformation of the region in which Romania is situated into a nuclear-free zone, convinced that the attainment of this objective fully corresponds to the interests of all the peoples of the Balkans and fits into the wider concern for security and co-operation in Europe and for a climate of peace and security in the world (CCD/PV.637).

Dealing with the need for the CCD to encourage the efforts of States in various regions of the world to establish nuclear-free zones the delegation of Romania reiterated its proposal that the CCD should formulate a framework agreement on regional denuclearization which could serve as a guide for negotiation of regional legal instruments in the field of denuclearization. It mentioned a number of possible basic elements of such a framework agreement [among which]: (1) the agreement should be considered as an integral part of a system of measures to lead to the complete elimination of the nuclear arms; (2) it should provide mutual obligations for all parties; (3) it should offer guarantees for equal security to all parties, with the

States possessing nuclear weapons assuming the solemn commitment not to use those weapons against the States parties to such zones and not to threaten them with their use, and also observing the status agreed upon among the States of the region; (4) it should not limit in any way the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; (5) it should establish a system of clear and equitable control based on the principle of full equality of States.

The delegation of Romania also suggested that the United Nations Secretariat should prepare a compendium of the various ideas relevant for such a framework agreement on regional denuclearization which have been put forward by delegations in the CCD, United Nations General Assembly and in other forums (CCD/PV.652).

The delegation of Nigeria referred to the declaration adopted by the OAU in July 1964 aimed at making Africa a nuclear-free zone, and said that in the light of recent developments, it intended to take a second look at this declaration (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the United States of America expressed the view that it would be a constructive development if African nations decided to re-examine the question of an African nuclear-free zone. The delegation stated that the United States had supported the United Nations General Assembly Resolution which had endorsed the proposal for such a zone. The delegation also pointed out that in 1965 the United States delegation had suggested four criteria for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone and refined these the following year; namely, that the initiative should be taken by the States in the region concerned, that the zone should preferably include all States in the area whose participation is deemed important, that the creation of a zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements, and that provision should be made for adequate verification. The delegation said that the United States Government would be interested in further expressions of views on this subject (CCD/PV.639).

The delegation of Mexico, as representative of the depository Government of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and in keeping with its long-standing tradition of maintaining CCD members informed of all new developments concerning that Treaty, took special pleasure in recording that France and the People's Republic of China had deposited their instruments of ratification of the Treaty's Additional Protocol II on 22 March and 12 June 1974, respectively. The delegation noted that this brought to four the number of nuclear-weapon Powers which are Parties to that instrument, thus leaving the Soviet Union as the only nuclear-weapon State to which the Secretary-General has been transmitting the repeated appeals of the General Assembly concerning Additional Protocol II which has yet to lend its support to the Treaty (CCD/PV.652).

The delegation of Pakistan supported the idea of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various geographical regions of the world and announced that Pakistan had requested the inscription of a supplementary item on the agenda of the 29th Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled: "Declaration and Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia".

Noting that all the countries of South Asia had already proclaimed their opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons or to the introduction of such weapons into the region, it stated that the recent events made the time ripe for declaring South Asia as a nuclear free zone. It said that the Treaty of Tlatelolco could be a model for a similar agreement among the countries of South Asia. (CCD/PV.654).

B. Non-nuclear Measures

Questions of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Having in mind the recommendations of General Assembly Resolution 3077 (XXVIII), the Conference continued its efforts to achieve progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical weapons. Members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament emphasized the importance and urgency which they attach to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that, in spite of the thorough consideration by the Committee of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, there was still no substantial progress toward its solution. It held that the USSR was in favour of the complete prohibition of all types of chemical weapons -- the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling, and the destruction of their stockpiles. In connexion with the signing of the Convention of the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons by more than one hundred States, the delegation said that the task was to make the Convention another operative international instrument as soon as possible (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of the United States asserted that the United States remained firmly committed to the objective of achieving effective international restraints on chemical weapons. It understood and shared the desire to make rapid progress in controlling chemical weapons, but continued to believe that genuine progress could only be made by a careful study of all the complex issues involved (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of Mexico noted that, although two years had passed since the Biological Weapons Convention was opened for signature and although the General Assembly had since adopted three resolutions reaffirming the objective of effective prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, it had not yet been possible to conduct the "negotiations in good faith" intended to lead to the "early agreement" referred to in Article IX of that Convention. The delegation also stated that, according to well-informed opinion, the production of "binary weapons" would mean that "the prohibition of chemical weapons would become virtually impossible" (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of the Netherlands stated that the advantage of the approach contained in the Japanese working paper on chemical weapons (CCD/413) was that it made possible the adoption of partial measures in the broader context of a comprehensive ultimate goal. It pointed out, however, that there might be some reluctance to accept a treaty with a mixture of obligations -- that is, obligations which became binding on the acceptance of the treaty and obligations which became effective only if and when supplementary agreements are concluded. It said that there should be a reasonable measure of certainty that such supplementary agreements are forthcoming. The delegation also asserted that national control systems could not by themselves provide assurance to other parties and therefore could not form the cornerstone of a chemical weapons control system (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Pakistan said that General Assembly statements by the United States (A/C.1/PV.1934), the Soviet Union (A/C.1/PV.1938) and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/PV.1941) regarding Japanese working paper CCD/413 were positive indications that the representatives see in the Japanese proposal sufficient merit to take the step from discussion to negotiation (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of the United Kingdom said that its aim remained the achievement of an effective, adequately verified, and comprehensive ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. It also informed the Committee that in February the United Kingdom Government had completed the necessary legislative processes to enable it to ratify the Biological Weapons Convention, and it urged early ratification by other signatory States so that the Convention could enter into force as soon as possible (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Bulgaria believed that after two years of deliberations of a general nature the time had come for detailed substantive negotiations (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Japan tabled a "draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" (CCD/420). The draft convention, the delegation said, was based on two principles: first, that the agreement should prescribe a comprehensive ban; and second, that, since it would not be realistic to expect a comprehensive ban to be achieved from the outset, a comprehensive prohibition should be achieved in stages. Accordingly, while Article I of the draft convention adopts purpose criteria in prohibiting all chemical agents and related activities intended for hostile purposes, Article IV provides that States may, in accordance with Annex I, take provisional measures until further agreements, including those on effective verification measures, are reached. Annex I of the draft convention enables States to exclude temporarily certain chemical agents from the scope of the prohibition. The delegation of Japan pointed out that the scope of agents excluded in this manner would be narrowed gradually through review conferences as provided for in Article XVII. The draft convention also calls for a combination of national and international verification measures. It contains provisions for the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of chemical agents in the presence of observers from an international verification agency, for the preparation and submission of periodic reports by national control organs, for the establishment and functions of an international verification agency, for procedures to request explanations regarding compliance with treaty obligations and for the initiation of international inspections on the territories of parties requested to provide such explanations (CCD/PV.631).

The delegation of Hungary welcomed the submission of the draft convention by the delegation of Japan and expressed the view that this initiative would give new impetus to the work of seeking a solution for the prohibition of all chemical weapons (CCD/PV.632)

The delegation of Sweden expressed appreciation for the effort of the Japanese delegation and hoped that it would open the way for a final negotiation. It held that the structure of the draft convention was interesting. It maintained that the choice between alternatives A and B for Annex I would largely be decided on the basis of technical considerations regarding scope and verification and that therefore it would be desirable to hold informal meetings with chemical weapons experts in order to hear views of other delegations on these matters (CCD/PV.633).

The delegation of the Soviet Union noted with satisfaction the initiative taken by the delegation of Japan. It emphasized that the scope of prohibition was a basic question to which all other provisions of a convention should be subordinate. It pointed out that this draft, which represents a positive contribution by Japan to the consideration of the problem, will be studied by the Soviet side with due attention. It recalled that the socialist countries, in their draft convention, had proposed the prohibition of all types of chemical weapons and all related activities and indicated that the authors of the socialist draft expected a specific answer regarding scope from the Western countries. The delegation also indicated that it was prepared to consider favourably the question of participating in the informal meetings with experts (CCD/PV.633).

The delegation of Mongolia indicated its appreciation to the Japanese delegation for elaborating and submitting its draft convention, and expressed the view that much had been done in the draft to find a compromise between differing viewpoints. The delegation wished to know whether it would be possible for the Secretariat to prepare a comparative table of the views of various delegations or groups of delegations on the main provisions of a future chemical weapons convention (CCD/PV.634).

The delegation of Czechoslovakia recalled that in approximately one year mankind would mark the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons of war. The delegation expressed the hope that on the date of the fiftieth anniversary of the existence of the Protocol other States would join it which would secure its further universality and reaffirm its international significance (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of Poland expressed the view that a convention limited to the prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons, failing to provide for the destruction of existing stocks, would be of little practical consequence until after those stocks had deteriorated and lost their military value. In this regard, the delegation noted with satisfaction that the Japanese approach to the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of stockpiles had remarkably evolved since last year. It stated, however, that the draft convention seemed to exclude binary weapons from the scope of measures envisaged for the first stage and that the Polish delegation had definite doubts about this matter (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of Czechoslovakia expressed appreciation to the delegation of Japan for looking for compromise solutions satisfying all delegations as to existing stocks of chemical weapons. It said that, unlike working paper CCD/413, the draft convention called for the destruction of existing stocks of the prohibited chemical weapons and therefore was a considerable improvement (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of Japan welcomed the formal proposal of the delegation of Sweden for informal meetings with experts. These meetings, the delegation said, would help in clarifying a number of issues left open in the Japanese draft convention (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of Romania reiterated its stand in favour of the elimination of chemical weapons as an integral part of the process of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular of the nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.648).

The delegation of Italy held that the initial scope of a treaty will not depend solely on an abstract political will of States, but on the treaty provisions for effective controls. It stated that the broader and more effective the system of controls written into the treaty, the greater will be the readiness of States adhering to such a treaty to accept increasingly wider measures of limitation and prohibition. In particular, the delegation said that the obligation to destroy stocks raised the requirement of adequate verification. It expressed the hope that the opportunity afforded by the Japanese initiative would be seized by all in order to reach positive conclusions in the shortest possible time (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Egypt stated that its position on the question of chemical weapons has been constantly defined on previous occasions. It pointed out that its approach to this problem has been defined in the working paper which it, together with non-aligned delegations, has submitted (CCD/400).

The delegation of Egypt stated that the Japanese draft convention, together with the draft convention presented by the socialist delegations (CCD/361), and the working paper submitted by the 10 non-aligned States' delegations (CCD/400), constituted an adequate basis for meaningful negotiations towards an agreed text (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Canada stated that the draft convention put forward by the socialist countries and the paper submitted by the non-aligned States have not resolved the question of how to achieve an adequately verified comprehensive ban. With respect to the verification provisions contained in the Japanese draft treaty, the delegation held that the international on-site verification of destruction of declared stocks was technically feasible and would involve the most minimal political or commercial intrusion. It recognized that the general approach of verification by challenge was designed to meet the difficult political restrictions imposed on the Committee, but that the approach nevertheless had the demerit of placing the onus on the challenger. The delegation doubted that such an approach, even combined with the verification of the destruction of stocks, would provide sufficient assurances at this time for States perceiving a CW threat to adhere to a comprehensive ban. It added that for this reason it was appropriate that the Japanese draft treaty put forward these verification proposals in the context of a phased approach (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of Nigeria said it would like a comprehensive study to be made on the status and scope of application of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It indicated that it would like to see the scope of the Protocol expanded to cover warfare against crops and animals and all contingencies of armed conflict (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that the difficulties impeding the solution to the problem were due not to questions of verification but to the unwillingness of some States to take a political decision renouncing chemical warfare agents (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the United States welcomed the Japanese draft treaty as a constructive step forward toward our common objective of achieving effective restraints on chemical weapons. It believed that the provisions of the draft treaty dealing with verification could point the Committee's consideration of verification issues in a promising direction. The delegation also said that the gradual approach adopted in the draft treaty was consistent with the principle that the scope of chemical weapons limitations should be related to the possibilities for effective verification (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the United States indicated that during the recess the United States Government had continued its studies of chemical weapons and that it planned to submit three working papers based on US studies (CCD/PV.639).

The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that when the positions of Western countries are known with respect to the initial scope of chemical weapons prohibitions, it will be possible to judge if there exist favourable prospects for progress in the negotiations. The delegation also informed the Committee that the Soviet Union intended to ratify the Biological Weapons Convention this year. The Soviet delegation stressed that to put that measure into effect at an early date, the States depositaries of the Convention on bacteriological weapons must speed the process of their ratification (CCD/PV.639).

The delegation of the United Kingdom welcomed the announcement at the Moscow summit that the United States and Soviet Union have agreed to consider a joint initiative in the CCD with respect to chemical weapons. It stated that the United Kingdom was committed to seek effective measures for a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing stockpiles. It had also said that it was prepared to consider partial measures. It asserted that a comprehensive prohibition which did not cater to the need of signatories to be assured of other States' compliance would create risks of military instability. The delegation added that, while the Japanese draft convention tackles constructively the problem of what the international community should do once a breach of the convention has been detected, it does not, as it stands, show how the early detection of a suspected breach would take place (CCD/PV.641).

The delegation of the Soviet Union noted that a number of countries had raised objections to the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. It expressed the view that it was possible to conclude an international agreement only if the opinions of all parties concerned had been taken into account and that the "all or nothing" approach could not lead to success. Therefore, the delegation continued, in an effort to conclude an effective international agreement which would exclude chemical weapons from the arsenals of states, the Soviet Union had agreed to consider with the United States a joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare (CCD/PV.642).

The Delegation of Japan stated that discovering for which substances effective verification measures could be found under the present circumstances was the key to deciding the scope of substances which were to be prohibited first. It also answered questions posed earlier by representatives of Sweden (CCD/PV.635), Poland (CCD/PV.635), and the United States (CCD/PV.638). The Delegation noted with special attention the part of the joint United States-Soviet Union communique in which the United States and Soviet Union agreed to consider a joint initiative on chemical weapons and maintained that the CCD's deliberations would be greatly expedited if such an initiative were taken (CCD/PV.643).

The Delegation of the United States noted that at the Moscow summit the United States and Soviet Union, desiring to contribute to early progress toward an international agreement which would exclude chemical weapons from the arsenals of states, had agreed to consider a joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare. The Delegation stated that the United States, for its part, will work seriously to fulfill that statement of joint purpose (CCD/PV.643).

The Delegation of Canada suggested that the Committee consider an alternative to the concept in the Japanese draft convention applying to Annex I whereby the phasing of the prohibition would not be on the basis of excluded agents, but rather on the basis of excluded activities. Under this approach, the Delegation explained, all governments would be expected to agree to prohibit the production and development of agents, munitions and delivery systems, while those states having CW stocks would agree to the destruction of an agreed quantity of their stocks within a fixed period. It further stated that the Review Conference procedure would provide a mechanism for negotiation of further phases involving, in one or more steps, the destruction of all remaining stocks and the implementation of a comprehensive ban (CCD/PV.643).

On 17, 18, 19, and 22 July 1974, informal meetings took place, at the request of the Delegation of Sweden supported by a number of other delegations, with the participation of technical experts from thirteen member states. A discussion of questions pertaining to the scope and verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons took place at those meetings. Members of the Committee found these informal meetings of value in promoting their work on the question of the effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The following documents were presented for discussion at the informal meetings:

CCD/427; Sweden; Some observations on the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction presented by the Delegation of Japan on 30 April 1974 (CCD/420).

CCD/430; Japan; Working Paper containing views of Japanese experts on the scope of prohibition and on the verification of organophosphorus compounds for the informal meetings with participation of experts of the CCD in 1974.

CCD/432; Finland; Methodology for chemical analysis and identification of CW agents.

CCD/433; Canada; The problem of defining compounds having military significance as irritating and incapacitating agents.

CCD/434; Canada; Destruction and disposal of Canadian stocks of World War II mustard agent.

CCD/435; United States; Working paper on toxicity of chemical warfare agents.

CCD/436; United States; Working paper on chemical agent destruction.

CCD/437; United States; Working paper on diversion of commercial chemicals for weapons.

The Delegation of Czechoslovakia welcomed the statement on chemical weapons in the United States-Soviet Union joint communique as proving the good will of both sides to tackle the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons in a businesslike manner. While the Delegation believed that the Committee should continue to aim at a complete ban, if a majority of members desired a step-by-step approach to that goal through partial measures, Czechoslovakia would not stand in their way (CCD/PV.644).

The Delegation of India informed the Committee that on 15 July 1974 India had deposited its instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction in the capitals of the three depositary governments. The Delegation indicated that India supported the Convention because it was the first measure of actual disarmament and because it required that all parties assume equal obligations (CCD/PV.644).

The Delegation of the Soviet Union noted the positive contribution made by the experts in the informal meetings, but asserted that, without political decisions by states, the ideas and conclusions of the experts will not advance the discussions on the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Delegation also reiterated its view that, because of the difficulties and impracticability of international supervision of prohibitions of chemical weapons, a solution to the problem should be sought in the use of national means of supervision supplemented by certain international procedures. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that however important the problem of organizing control over the prohibition of chemical weapons may be, it is a secondary one and that it depends on the scope of the prohibition (CCD/PV.647).

The Delegation of Mongolia favourably assessed the declaration made by the USSR and the United States of America on their agreement to consider a joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.

The Delegation in that connexion stressed that if a so called phasing-out method were to be applied the first step should encompass the widest possible categories of the means of chemical warfare, and suggested that such a method would have more relevance in the case of certain dual-purpose agents and substances that could be discovered in the future (CCD/PV.652).

The Delegation of Italy noted that the tendency and practicability of an "instalment agreement", based on the principle of a global prohibition of CW, have gradually emerged from the discussion within the CCD and from contact between experts. It said that the problem of reaching a precise definition of CW and a clear determination of the initial sphere of application of the treaty will most likely be solved by experts. The Italian Delegation also said that the problem of control is not a secondary one and that verification should be carried out through the adoption of appropriate national and international systems of control. In particular, the Delegation said that a positive approach on the subject of control will test the real political will of Governments represented in the CCD to achieve effective measures for banning CW (CCD/PV.562).

The Delegation of Bulgaria stated that it continued to favour the concept of a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, but, taking into account that at present the only realistic approach to solve the problem was the gradual one, it gave its full support to the statement on chemical weapons in the USSR-United States joint communique. The Bulgarian Delegation expressed the view that the difficulties inherent in the present situation where some States are and some others are not parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol were even further compounded in the Japanese draft convention (CCD/420) in that it allowed for some States to submit to a total ban from the very beginning whereas others might opt for the gradual alternative (CCD/PV.649).

The Delegation of Mexico noted that the draft convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons submitted by Japan had been one of the few positive contributions to the Committee's 1974 session. The Delegation expressed the hope that this imaginative and commendable effort would stimulate negotiations and draw a constructive response from the two superpowers, especially from the one which until now has refrained from submitting a draft treaty or convention of its own (CCD/PV.650).

that there is a problem in establishing the comparability of budget information which might be provided, and expressed the hope that the study by an expert group convened by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3093B will arrive at a generally accepted definition of what is to be understood by military budgets (CCD/PV.639).

The Delegation of the United Kingdom stated that it attached importance to the concept of openness on military expenditure and pointing out that details of the United Kingdom defence budget are available to all, expressed the hope that other States which do not already do so will make details of their spending public (CCD/PV.641)

The Delegation of India spoke about the world economic situation lending a greater urgency to the task of disarmament. In this context the Delegation welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union which had resulted in the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of Resolution 3093 (XXVIII) regarding the 'Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries' which constitutes a step in the right direction. It urged all the permanent members of the Security Council to accept the principle and act in accordance with the General Assembly's recommendation (CCD/PV.636).

The Delegation of Romania expressed the view that one step that could be taken towards the cessation of the arms race and especially of the nuclear arms race would be to freeze and reduce military budgets in accordance with a concrete programme beginning with the budgets of the heavily armed countries. In this connexion it referred to the resolution 3075 (XXVIII) of the General Assembly (CCD/PV.637, CCD/PV.648).

The delegation of Mexico expressed the view that the negotiations called for in the Seabeds Treaty concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed have been conspicuous by their absence (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of Sweden said that the fact that the CCD has not devoted any work to negotiations concerning further measures in the field of disarmament regarding the seabed may partly be due to the fact that it has focused on other disarmament matters, and partly, perhaps, because it has been felt that the Law of the Sea Conference should first yield some guidance for future work. The delegation expressed the view, however, that the Committee must soon start serious negotiations on the admittedly difficult task of obtaining complete demilitarization of the seabed (CCD/PV.633).

Poland stated that the consideration by the CCD of the question of the total demilitarization of the seabed was pressing in view of the commitments contracted in the Seabed Treaty as well as the 1977 review conference provided for in its Article VII (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of the USSR stressed the need for practical negotiations on further steps to demilitarize the seabed in accordance with the obligations, taken by the parties to the Seabed Treaty, which entered into force in 1972. The USSR delegation stressed that the Soviet position on the seabed was set out in the draft Treaty on Probibition of the Use for Military Purposes of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, submitted to the Committee in 1969 and this position is still in force. The USSR delegation said that it awaits concrete observations and suggestions on this topic from other members of the Committee which it will examine with due attention (CCD/PV.638, 639).

The delegation of Bulgaria expressed its support for measures aimed at the further demilitarization of the seabed. It also noted with interest the recent new proposal of the USSR aimed at the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of all Soviet and American ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. It was the Bulgarian delegation's belief that measures of that kind would serve the interests of all countries in the area and would contribute to the strengthening of peace and security throughout the world (CCD/PV.649).

The delegation of Sweden stated that the meteorological field requires closer attention by the Committee to see what measures can be taken to prevent the development of methods for meteorological warfare (CCD/PV.633).

The delegation of Poland said there was merit in the Swedish delegation's contention that the Committee should pay close attention to the area of meteorological warfare. It expressed the view, however, that before the Committee looks into this matter in greater detail, it should perhaps try to obtain expert opinion about the various implications of developments in these and related areas in order to be in a position to pursue an educated discussion (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that a number of delegations have rightly raised the question of the prohibition of such means of warfare as the modification of the environment for military purposes. The delegation expressed the view that modification techniques may be used for military purposes with respect not only to weather, but also to other components of human environment, and that this is another question requiring careful study. It noted that, having taken into account these considerations, the United States and the USSR had made a joint statement in Moscow in favour of the most effective measures possible in order to overcome the dangers of the use for military purposes of environmental modifications techniques, and that to achieve this goal they decided to hold this year a meeting of Soviet and United States representatives to study this problem (CCD/PV.642).

The delegation of the United States, referring to the joint communiqué at the conclusion of the Moscow Summit Conference, noted that the two sides jointly declared their support for the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environment modification techniques for military purposes, and that United States and Soviet representatives will meet this year to explore the problem and discuss what steps might be taken to remove the threat of the hostile use of these techniques (CCD/PV.643).

The delegation of Romania expressed the view that the CCD must move towards the practical consideration and application of military disengagement and disarmament measures. It reiterated a set of measures which it proposed in the past and it said that Romania also supports such measures to be taken at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as an integral element of the disarmament process on a world scale (CCD/PV.637).

* * * * *

The delegation of the United States of America stressed the desirability of considering the question of effective restraints on conventional weapons. It stated that it had in the past submitted for the consideration of the Committee a number of principles and guidelines related to such restraints, and that it would welcome the comments and views of others on this subject (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of the United Kingdom said it would be beneficial if countries were to discuss seriously the prospect of reaching regional agreements to control the over-growing volume of conventional weapons. The delegation referred to the fact that European States are engaged in a regional negotiation in Vienna and said it would be a welcome development if, within the context of the CCD, the representatives of other regions were to turn their attention to these difficult problems. The delegation also stated that the United Kingdom intends to play an active part in the projected conference of government experts at Lucerne concerning conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. It expressed the hope that the conference will provide a firm foundation for further progress on this subject. When actual measures of constraint came to be considered, it would be no surprise if they were found to be appropriate for discussion in the CCD (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Sweden stated that the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and weapons systems is an extremely important problem which merits serious international debate, and which should, at an appropriate time, be discussed in the CCD. At present, however, it believed that realistic negotiations to this end can only be conducted in regional forums. The delegation expressed the view, however, that the question of prohibiting the use of weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects should not be referred to the CCD at this stage (CCD/PV.633).

The delegation of India expressed the view that at present the non-nuclear weapon States should not be asked to forego even the meagre defence provided by conventional weapons. It also expressed the view that, when thought is ultimately given to disarmament in the conventional weapons field, it will be necessary to avoid any type of discriminatory treaty as an objective (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Italy referred to the experts' meeting on certain conventional weapons to be convened at Lucerne and expressed the hope that it will serve to clarify many difficult aspects of the problem. The delegation raised the question of whether the discussion of the weapons under consideration might not be better and more adequately conducted at the CCD. It expressed the view that the CCD might prove to be a more appropriate forum than any other for the elaboration, whenever this is found possible and necessary, of international instruments concerning the use of any particular type of conventional weapon (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Canada expressed support for the meeting of experts on the question of use of conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. It stated that through this meeting a modest beginning may be made towards the control of conventional weapons which it said was a subject which could usefully be pursued by the CCD (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the United Kingdom said it attached importance to the forthcoming meeting of experts in Lucerne, and that it intends to submit positive proposals for consideration concerning the complex legal, military, and medical problems involved (CCD/PV.641).

D. Question of general and complete disarmament

The delegation of Mexico stated that in regard to the "negotiations in good faith" on "a treaty on general and complete disarmament" under strict and effective international control, envisaged in article VI of the NPT, anyone who commented on these negotiations would necessarily have to employ a large dose of sarcasm (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of the Netherlands touched upon the problem of qualitative weapons development as the most destabilizing factor on the road towards general and complete disarmament. The delegation warned that it would be far better to aim at preventing development of new armaments than to let things slide in the hope of coming to agreed limitations at a later stage. It referred to estimates in a recent SIPRI study concerning annual levels of military research and development expenditure by the United States, USSR, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The delegation argued that the allocation of funds to military research and development should be decided upon by the political authorities in the light of long-term prospects of international co-operation. Countries usually will only then be ready to give up military options if they are reasonably assured that potential adversaries are doing the same. The heartening aspect of the talks in Vienna and in Geneva was that they are based on the realization that an unlimited arms race is in nobody's interest (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Italy expressed the view that the following pre-conditions are, and remain, valid for the whole field of disarmament: (1) any international disarmament measure should define equal rights and obligations for all parties,

(2) any measure must be sufficiently clear as to its scope, as well as to the rights and obligations it entails, (3) all activities and exercises undertaken in this field should be infused with a broader vision of the complex problems of disarmament, and (4) verification is an essential key to, and a fundamental component of, any international instrument concerning disarmament (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Egypt expressed the view that there can be little difference among members of the CCD on the urgent character of disarmament and the central position it occupies in contemporary international problems and present day international institutions. This central position of disarmament derives from its organic relationships with, and reciprocal influence on, the maintenance of international peace and security (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Romania expressed the view that disarmament has now become the consideration of all States and of all peoples, and that all must actively participate in bringing it about. The delegation expressed its concern at the lack of progress in the Committee on Disarmament and said that increased vigour and a fresh impetus are needed in its activities. The delegation stated that the CCD must address itself to the global issues of disarmament as set forth in its agenda, and, above all, to the questions of priority and of substance, namely, a halt to the arms race and disarmament (CCD/PV.637).

* * * * * *

A number of delegations commented on the question of the organizational forms of disarmament negotiation and expressed views regarding the desirability of the participation of all nuclear weapon States in disarmament efforts.

The delegation of the Soviet Union said the implementation of substantial disarmament measures requires the participation of militarily significant States including first of all the nuclear weapon Powers, and that it is necessaary to continue efforts to enlist the participation of all nuclear, near-nuclear, and other militarily significant States in the negotiations on disarmament and in the international disarmament agreements already concluded (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of Mexico, after reviewing the four multilateral measures that the CCD has produced in 12 years of labour, expressed the view that these measures have been truncated and mutilated despite the ardent desire of all the peoples of the world. It stated its view that if the CCD should disappear after what is now its third year of sterility, its epitaph might be that the road to its tomb has been paved with

formal promises and solemn undertakings that the nuclear super Powers have totally ignored and which mankind has so far longed in vain to see fulfilled (CCD/PV.627).

The delegation of Pakistan said it would not oppose considering the advisability of introducing appropriate reforms in the method of work and membership of the Committee, but that the objective must be to ensure that the geographic and political balance are maintained and that the negotiating role of the Committee is effectively preserved and strengthened (CCD/PV.630).

The delegation of Hungary stated that the present organizational and procedural set-up of the CCD has never prevented it from carrying out constructive negotiations leading to mutually acceptable agreements (CCD/PV.632).

The delegation of Sweden said that it is prepared to do everything in its power to strengthen multilateral negotiation machinery. It said that the CCD can put on record some major achievements in the field of disarmament, but, that despite the patient efforts of so many members of the Committee, the many initiatives taken to solve technical problems involved have been unfruitful (CCD/PV.633).

The delegation of Poland said that the major accomplishments of the CCD are only too well known and that, granted political will, it is fully capable of putting to good use its negotiating potential. The delegation also said it was odd that the Committee's record on the significance of the agreements, painstakingly elaborated under its auspices, should be belittled, or that the body should be denigrated for the lean years that the Committee has regrettably seen in its time (CCD/PV.635).

The delegation of India said that if the Committee is to remain a negotiating body and not become a forum for mere debate, its size must be kept within reasonable limits and its political balance should remain unchanged. It said that it had no fundamental objections to a change in the procedure of the Committee, but that any change must result in the improvement of the negotiating function and not otherwise (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Egypt expressed the view that the state of progress in the CCD, while being a reason for concern, should not be a cause for despair, and expressed the hope that the CCD will produce further milestones on the road towards disarmament comparable to its previous achievements. The delegation also said that it favoured an enlargement of the CCD which, while making the CCD more fully representative, would preserve its basic character as a negotiating organ (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Romania said that a body responsible for multilateral negotiations cannot function effectively unless there is genuine dialogue, the views

of all members are taken into consideration, and the participation of all is assured on the basis of the principle of equality of the participating States. It also said that the Committee is in a critical situation because it is being kept away from the most urgent disarmament problems concentrating on a single isolated topic, which leads to a loss of its perspective and ultimately to deadlock (CCD/PV.637).

The delegation of Canada said that it shared the disappointment of other delegations that the CCD has not made the progress expected of it. The delegation added, however, that it has no illusions that changes related to the organization of the CCD will add appreciably to its effectiveness. It expressed the view that a cause of weakness in the Committee is the fact that all major military Powers, and in particular all nuclear Powers, do not yet participate in its deliberations (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the Soviet Union said that it is not satisfied with the present state of affairs in the Committee's negotiations on disarmament, but that this state of affairs does not depend on the structure of the Committee. It said it fully shared the concern of States regarding the absence from the Committee of several militarily significant and important countries (CCD/PV.638).

The delegation of the United Kingdom said that the steady, patient work of the CCD is itself a contribution towards improved international relations. It said that while one cannot expect spectacular progress here or in any other conceivable forum which we can hope to devise, without progress in the political climate, it has no doubt that by perseverance the Committee may contribute towards the development of trust between nations. The delegation expressed the view that the CCD has the experience and dedication to treat the obstinate problems of disarmament with the respect and stubbornness they demand, and that one should not throw away this well-proven and practical body in a fit of exasperation at a check in momentum which all hope will be temporary. The delegation also cautioned against radically altering the structure of the CCD in the course of enlargement (CCD/PV.641).

The delegation of Mexico placed on record its hope that the enlargement of the Committee would enhance its effectiveness. In order to achieve that aim, the delegation expressed the view that it would be necessary not only to enlarge the Committee but at the same time to reorganize it. The delegation recalled that it had been advocating this since 1969 and had suggested a number of specific reforms (CCD/PV.650).

The delegation of Yugoslavia regretted that the Committee will not be able again to submit to the United Nations General Assembly any concrete results. It said that it would appreciate the creation of conditions conducive to the participation in multilateral disarmament negotiation of all nuclear-weapon and other militarily-significant States whose contribution would add to the achievement of concrete results (CCD/PV.651).

The United Kingdom delegation expressed the view that Australia would be able to make a particularly valuable contribution to the work of the Committee, and hoped that it would be possible to arrange their admission at a future date in a way which did not further enlarge the Committee in a manner which would prejudice its efficiency as a negotiating body.

The delegation of Mexico expressed its support for the candidacy of Australia, adding that if it proved necessary to include yet another member in order that the Co-Chairmen may reach agreement on that candidacy, this should not be an obstacle.

The Netherlands Government stated that it would not have any objection to Australia's joining the CCD if this could be effected without consequences for further enlargement.

The Yugoslav delegation wished to state that it bowed with sympathy to the Australian application for membership of the CCD and that it would support a consensus in the CCD in this regard.

* * * * *

Some delegations also devoted attention to the question of a world disarmament conference. The delegations of the USSR, Hungary, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania expressed support for the convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all the States of the world. They expressed the view that discussion at such a forum of urgent matters of disarmament would contribute to further normalization of international relations, as well as to progress in curbing the arms race and implementing disarmament measures (CCD/PV.627, 630, 632, 634, 635, 639).

The delegation of India expressed the view that a World Disarmament Conference held after adequate preparation and with the participation of all States, will promote the cause of general and complete disarmament. It said that India will exert the utmost effort to facilitate the convening of a World Disarmament Conference (CCD/PV.636).

The delegation of Czechoslovakia noted with satisfaction that the United Kingdom and France were taking part in the work of the ad hoc Committee in New York -- a good example to the other two nuclear Powers (CCD/PV.644).

The delegation of Yugoslavia reiterated that Yugoslavia will make all necessary efforts in the future, for an urgent convening of the World Disarmament Conference (CCD/PV.651).

## III. SPECIAL REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF A TREATY BANNING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

In its resolutions 3078A and B (XXVIII), the General Assembly asked the Conference to continue, as a matter of highest priority its deliberations on a treaty designed to achieve the objective of a comprehensive test ban. With this in mind, members of the Committee during 1974 continued to address the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests. Many delegations spoke in favour of the early achievement of a comprehensive treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons underground, some urged that all nations subscribe to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and some observed that to be truly comprehensive, a test ban treaty must prohibit tests in any environment by all nations.

The Delegation of the Soviet Union insisted on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, everywhere and by all, including underground tests. A corresponding agreement should be verified by national means supported by international co-operation of the parties in the exchange of seismic data. The Soviet Union is prepared to participate in such co-operation on certain conditions provided that it would form part of the agreement (CCD/PV 627).

The Delegation of the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the objective of a Comprehensive Test Ban with adequate verification, and its belief that adequate verification required some on-site inspection. Progress in the continuing seismic research programme relating to verification was described (CCD/PV 627).

The Delegation of Mexico noted that the General Assembly had already adopted some thirty resolutions on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, that in four of these resolutions it had condemned with the utmost vigour all such tests and that in three resolutions it had specially emphasized that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban". The Delegation also noted that this statement agreed in essence with what the Secretary-General had affirmed in 1972, that is, that "No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much study and discussion as the question of stopping nuclear-weapon tests. I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement". The Delegation asserted that the yearly average number of nuclear-weapon tests in the decade after the 1963 Moscow Treaty was 60 per cent higher than the 1945-1963 annual average (CCD/PV 627).

The Delegation of Japan affirmed its opposition to all nuclear weapon tests by any country, its request that tests in the atmosphere be stopped, and its desire that the nations involved in atmospheric testing participate in disarmament negotiations. It stressed that the absence of those nations should not be permitted to obstruct the discussions of a comprehensive test ban. It noted the relationship between the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the comprehensive test ban. It stated that a major obstacle to progress is not a view in favour of effective verification, but rather apathy or rejection concerning the necessity of effective verification measures. It referred, in this connexion, to the safeguard measures, including on-site inspection, accepted by States parties possessing no nuclear weapons under NPT and expressed the opinion that this implies that by so doing each of these non-nuclear States completely fulfils its obligations under the Treaty, leaving no room for doubt to others, and thereby also expresses its desire to see confidence among nations increased. Accordingly, it held the view that international verification measures impinge on national sovereignty is a prerequisite for real progress in disarmament negotiations. On the other hand, the Delegation urged that verification be dealt with in full recognition of the necessity for practicality; that it be recognized that "effective verification" and "complete verification" are not synonymous (CCD/PV 628).

The Netherlands Delegation endorsed the views expressed by the Delegation of Japan, and questioned arguments that on-site inspection is unacceptable as a matter of principle. It observed, however, that even with on-site inspection there would be room for some clandestine testing. The choice is whether to accept this risk or the risk posed by continued unrestricted testing. The Netherlands Government, it said, is deeply convinced that cessation of testing is a prerequisite to halting the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV 630).

The Delegation of Pakistan noted that in spite of extensive debates following a long series of resolutions by the General Assembly, a treaty for a comprehensive test ban is not in sight because of disagreement on verification. The Delegation of Pakistan believes that on-site inspections no longer are essential for a viable verification system; it expressed the view that all tests above ten, and, with development, five kilotons, could be detected by national means. The Delegation believes that an agreement would be an indispensable factor in slowing down the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV 630).

The Delegation of the United Kingdom agreed with the views of the Delegation of Japan (CCD/PV 628, p. 9) on verification. It defined adequate verification as that which satisfies all parties concerned, and stated the United Kingdom objective of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty and the cessation of all nuclear test explosions for weapons purposes in all environments and by all countries. The United Kingdom hoped to furnish the Committee a further technical contribution in the course of the summer (CCD/PV 630).

The Delegation of Bulgaria reaffirmed its support for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons tests everywhere and by all States, and asserted its belief that national means of control are adequate to provide verification, but that these can be supplemented by the international exchange of seismic data. It cited insistence on on-site inspection as an example of how unjustified verification requirements can become an obstacle to solution of disarmament problems; verification measures should not go beyond their purpose of offering reasonable guarantees of compliance. The Delegation stated that a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests is not possible without participation of all nuclear weapons powers (CCD/PV 630).

The Delegation of Hungary, noting that for more than ten years no real progress has been made toward a comprehensive test ban treaty, stated its opinion that the means are at hand to detect and verify nuclear weapons tests, and called for participation by all nuclear powers (CCD/PV 632).

The Delegation of Sweden noted that in spite of exceptional effort no concrete result has been reached on a comprehensive test ban, which it regards as the most important immediate step that can be taken to halt the nuclear arms race. It suggested that lack of political will, emanating from supposed military advantages of continued testing, has often been cited as the only obstacle to a treaty. It proposed that the cessation of underground tests by the two main testing powers would improve prospects for cessation of all nuclear tests. The Delegation cited the dangers inherent in "mini-nukes" as an additional reason for cessation of testing (CCD/PV 633).

The Mongolian delegation, noting that some representative of the western powers tended to confuse the concept of effective control with on-site inspection, stated that effective verification was not equivalent to on-site inspection. (CCD/634).

The Delegation of Czechoslovakia cited opinions that the Committee should proceed to discussions leading to a concrete agreement banning nuclear tests, but observed that this requires acceptance by the nuclear powers of a political decision. It concurred in the view that national means of verification are sufficient, supplemented by the exchange of seismic data and by consultation, and suggested that the continued insistence on on-site inspection by some delegations hides an unwillingness to accede to a ban on all nuclear tests. The Delegation stated that participation by all nuclear weapon States in both the Moscow Agreement of 1963 and in a "comprehensive test ban", without exception, is essential according to the meaning of the term. The term "comprehensive" has two aspects: banning all tests in all environments, and equal application of the ban to all states. Two nuclear powers alone cannot attain a "comprehensive test ban" (CCD/PV 635).

The Delegation of India stressed the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban in checking the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race. It added that the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty should be fully observed and those nuclear weapon States which have not yet subscribed to that treaty should do so without further delay (CCD/PV 636).

The delegation of Italy noted the relation of the testing issue to the NPT review, and observed that agreement on a comprehensive test ban cannot be reached until such an agreement contains provisions for verification satisfactory to all parties to the treaty. It suggested, therefore, that efforts to agree on a solution might include the adoption of temporary or partial measures (CCD/PV 636). The delegation of Egypt stated that its position on the question of a comprehensive test ban has been constantly defined on previous occasions. It drew attention to the fact that the General Assembly reiterated in resolution 3078 A its conviction that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.

The delegation of the Soviet Union expressed disagreement with the claim that international on-site inspection was required for adequate control over cessation of underground tests (CCD/PV 639).

The delegation of the United Kingdom welcomed the bilateral United States/USSR threshold treaty as another step on the path toward a comprehensive test ban agreement, and recalled that the United Kingdom Government had committed themselves to abide by its provisions. The delegation reaffirmed the aim of the United Kingdom to pursue the goal of a CTB stated in the preamble to the threshold treaty, and stated that a working paper to that end would shortly be tabled, dealing with the problem of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions (CCD/PV/641). This working paper was subsequently tabled as Document CCD/440.

The delegation of Japan noted recent atmospheric tests in the Pacific ocean and Asia, and other underground tests by the nuclear weapons powers, and reiterated the opposition of the Government of Japan to any test by any country, and its desire for the earliest possible realization of nuclear disarmament. It adjured the testing countries to bring about the cessation of all tests, citing the environmental effects of atmospheric tests and possibly of underground tests. It urged participation in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, particularly by the countries now testing in the atmosphere. The delegation expressed dissatisfaction with the effective date of the bilateral Threshold treaty, but assessed the Threshold agreement as a step forward toward a comprehensive ban, and it raised the question of how the bilateral agreement is to be developed into a broader, multilateral agreement. It noted the unwritten understanding that peaceful nuclear explosions above 150 kilotons will be monitored by observers, and observed that if this understanding takes concrete form it will make the results of the summit meeting even more constructive (CCD/PV 642).

The delegation of the Soviet Union drew attention to the important contribution of the Soviet-United States summit meeting to solution of the problem of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and described the provisions of the new Threshold Treaty, and the accompanying Protocol (CCD/PV 642).

The delegation of the United States reported that in the absence of any prospect of early resolution of the problems of verifying a comprehensive test ban, leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to take a partial but significant step toward the objective of a CTB by signing the Threshold Treaty. It noted that such partial measures had been recommended by several members of the Committee, and expressed the belief that the Treaty would have significant moderating effect on nuclear arms competition between the parties, by helping to preclude development of new generations of high-yield warheads compatible with modern delivery systems. The effective date will permit further detailed discussions of the requirements for verification, time for the exchange of verification-related data, and for negotiation of the integrally-related agreement covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The delegation noted the declared intention of the Parties to negotiate with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests, reaffirming the United States commitment to an adequately-verified comprehensive test ban. The delegation described the requirements for verifying that peaceful explosions do not serve weapons development, and noted that this has been the subject of an understanding in principle, including the presence of observers (CCD/PV 643).

The delegation of Czechoslovakia acknowledged with gratitude the circulation of the Threshold Treaty documents in the Committee, and expressed hope that the agreement marks the beginning of a new phase in negotiation on test prohibition and nuclear disarmament. It stated that the Treaty represented a first major step in the direction of complete prohibition, and that its importance lies in limitation of further development of strategic weapons, reducing the danger of a new cycle in the strategic arms race. The delegation noted the undertaking by the Parties to limit tests to a minimum, and observed that control will be by national means, supplemented by consultation and the exchange of information. It cited the treaty as an example of the operation of political will, rather than removal of technical difficulties (CCD/PV 644).

The delegation of Sweden observed that six countries had conducted tests of nuclear devices in recent months, more than ever before, and stated its opinion that continued testing by the two major nuclear weapons nations involved greater risks than prohibition of all tests. It suggested that continued testing did not strengthen the NPT, but noted that from the environmental point of view atmospheric tests were more harmful than those conducted underground. Commenting that in recent years a majority of United States and Soviet tests have been below the 150 kiloton threshold established in the new treaty, the delegation foresaw only a moderate decrease in the frequency of tests under the treaty, and an increase in the number of tests above the threshold before the treaty becomes effective. The delegation expressed the hope that the threshold treaty would not lead to a false sense of security; would not be seen as legitimizing testing below 150 kilotons. Development of precision guidance is seen as the technical reason behind the Threshold Test Treaty. The advantage of reduced destruction in war, the delegation said, may be offset by its increased likelihood. The delegation noted the bilateral nature of the Threshold Treaty, expressed a desire for multilateral access to the data exchanged to facilitate control, as well as for multilateral observation of PNEs, and proposed existing IAEA procedures for such observation as a starting point. It called for international inspection when the nuclear weapons powers conduct PNEs anywhere for any purpose, and stated that the Threshold Treaty might or might not make a comprehensive ban easier to obtain. It might be regarded as closing the testing issue; but, on the other hand, the detailed control co-operation arrangements under the Threshold Treaty could facilitate agreement on the control issues in a comprehensive ban (CCD/PV 647).

The delegation of Mexico took a rather sceptical view of the Moscow Treaty of 3 July 1974 between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. The delegation's scepticism was based on the following considerations: first, the promise contained in the Treaty's article I(3) that the Parties "shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests" comes after (1) eleven years of waiting in vain for the translation into acts of the

"determination" so solemnly proclaimed in the preamble to the 1963 PTB Treaty, to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and (2) some thirty resolutions by the General Assembly urging the nuclear Powers to put an end to all nuclear-weapon tests; second, reliable studies show that in the past few years the vast majority of nuclear explosions carried out by the two superpowers have been below the 150 kiloton threshold; third, the agreement will not enter into force until 31 March 1976, leaving a twenty-month period in which, as experience in similar cases has shown, the two superpowers will engage in an all-out race to test nuclear weapons, even those over 150 kts; and fourth, according to the best-qualified experts, the superpowers will have no difficulty at all in completing, before the Treaty enters into force, all the new generations of nuclear warheads which they had planned (CCD/PV.650).

The delegation of Yugoslavia reiterated its Government's opposition to all nuclear-weapon tests, in all environments and by all States, (CCD/PV 651) - page 15.

* * * * *

The Committee agreed to reconvene on a day to be established by the co-Chairmen in consultation with all members of the Committee.

This report is transmitted by the co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

United States of America

ANNEX A

LIST OF WORKING PAPERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

On 16 April 1974, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Co-Chairmen a letter containing the resolutions of the General Assembly (CCD/419).

On 30 April 1974, the representative of Japan submitted a Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction (CCD/420).

On 14 May 1974, the representative of Sweden submitted a paper on presentation of defence expenditures and their distribution for defence purposes (CCD/421).

On 23 May 1974, the representative of Pakistan submitted some excerpts from the statement made on 19 May 1974 by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the nuclear underground test explosion conducted by India on 18 May 1974 (CCD/422).

On 23 May 1974, the representative of Pakistan submitted a Statement issued on 19 May 1974 at Islamabad by an official spokesman of the Government of Pakistan on India's explosion of an underground nuclear device on 18 May 1974 (CCD/423).

On 23 May 1974, the representative of India submitted the text of the official announcement made by the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, regarding the underground peaceful nuclear explosion experiment conducted on 18 May 1974. (CCD/424).

On 23 May 1974, the representative of India submitted a Statement made by the Minister of External Affairs of India on 21 May 1974 on the peaceful underground nuclear explosion conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission of India on 18 May 1974 (CCD/425).

On 23 May 1974, the representative of Canada submitted the text of a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp 22 May 1974 (CCD/426).

On 2 July 1974, the representative of Sweden submitted some observations on the Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction presented by the delegation of Japan on 30 April 1974 - CCD/420 (CCD/427).

On 11 July 1974, the representative of Pakistan submitted a text on strengthening the security of non-nuclear States (CCD/428).

On 11 July 1974, the representative of Nigeria submitted a letter dated 5 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the Special representative of the Secretary-General to the CCD (CCD/429).

On 12 July 1974, the representative of Japan submitted a Working Paper containing views of Japanese experts on the scope of prohibition and on the verification for organophosphorus compounds for the informal meetings with participation of experts of the CCD in 1974 (CCD/430).

On 16 July 1974, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America submitted a Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests (CCD/431).

On 16 July 1974, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submitted a letter dated 12 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Special Representative transmitting a Working Paper by the Government of Finland on methodology for chemical analysis and identification of CW agents -- Progress of a Finnish research project (CCD/432).

On 16 July 1974, the representative of Canada submitted a paper on the problem of defining compounds having military significance as irritating and incapacitating agents (CCD/433).

On 16 July 1974, the representative of Canada submitted a paper on destruction and disposal of Canadian stocks of World War II Mustard Agent (CCD/434).

On 16 July 1974, the representative of the United States of America submitted a Working Paper on toxicity of chemical warfare agents (CCD/435).

On 16 July 1974, the representative of the United States of America submitted a Working Paper on chemical agent destruction (CCD/436).

On 16 July 1974, the representative of the United States of America submitted a Working Paper on diversion of commercial chemicals for weapons (CCD/437).

On 1 August 1974, the representative of Sweden submitted a paper on underground nuclear test activities in the United States and the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1973 (CCD/438).

On 6 August 1974, the representative of Mexico submitted a letter dated 6 August 1974 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/439).

On 13 August 1974, the representative of the United Kingdom submitted a Working Paper on a development in discriminating between seismic sources (CCD/440).

On 13 August 1974, the representatives of Japan and Sweden submitted a Working Paper on the identification of seismic events in the USSR using seismological data from observatories in Japan and Sweden (CCD/441).

On 13 August 1974, the representative of Japan submitted a Working Paper on the accuracy of locating seismic events (CCD/442).

ANNEX B

Texts of Working Papers and Other Committee Documents

ANNEX C

List of Verbatim Records

627th Meeting to 638th Meeting (16 April to 23 May 1974)
CCD/PV.627 to 638

639th Meeting to 654th Meeting (2 July to 22 August 1974)
CCD/PV.639 to 654